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Abstract
This paper aims at discussing the importance of Leibniz Law to getting models
for Paraconsistent Set Theories.
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1 Introduction
Paraconsistency is the study of logic systems having a negation ¬ which is not explosive;
that is, there exist formulas α and β in the language of the logic such that β is not derivable
from the contradictory set {α,¬α}. In other words, the logic has contradictory, but non-
trivial theories. There are several approaches to paraconsistency in the literature since the
introduction of Jaskowski’s system of Discursive logic such as Relevant logics, Adaptive
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logics, Many-valued logics, and many others in 1948. The well-known 3-valued logic of
Paradox (LP) was introduced by Priest with the aim of formalizing the philosophical
perspective underlying Priest and Sylvan’s Dialetheism. As it is well-known, the main
thesis behind Dialetheism is that there are true contradictions, that is, that some sentences
can be both true and false at the same time and in the same way. The logic LP has been
intensively studied and developed by several authors proposing, particularly, extensions
to first-order languages and applications to Set Theory.
The 1963 publication of da Costa’s Habilitation thesis Sistemas Formais Inconsis-
tentes constitutes a landmark in the history of paraconsistency. In that thesis, da Costa
introduced the hierarchy Cn (for n ≤ 1) and Cω of C-systems, [12].
Recall that Cω is defined over the signature Σ = {→,∧,∨,¬} and the language LΣ
determined by the Hilbert calculus from axiom schemas from Intuitionistic Positive Cal-
culus, the rule modus ponens and the following axiom schemata: (Cω 1) α∨¬α and (Cω
2) ¬¬α→ α.
In 1969, da Costa visited Universidad Nacional del Sur and suggested finding a se-
mantics for Cn and Cω to Fidel. In that time, they knew that the negation ¬ was not
congruencial. In fact, as we proved in [14], Cw is not algebrizable with Blok-Pigozzi’s
method. Fidel overcame this difficulty by means of a presentation of a novel algebraic-
relational class of structures called F-structure by adapting Lindenbaum-Tarski method
in order to prove completeness theorems. The F -structure are pairs 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉 where
A is a generalized Heyting algebra and Nx is a set of all possible negation of x ∈ A. The
algebraic part of the structures captures the algebrizable fragment of the system, that is
to say, the negation-free fragment.
In our paper [17], we apply Fidel’s method in order to prove an adequacy theorem,
in the strong version for Cω and we also present models for first-order Cω (QCω) logic by
adapting our work developed in [16].
The paper is organized as follow: In the section 2, we do a brief review state of art of the
classical Set Theory and non-classical Set Theories in the setting of the existences of their
model. In section 3, first we do a summary of the known Paraconsistent Set Theories and
we discuss the importance of Leibniz Law to obtain models for da Costa’s Paraconsistent
Set theory. Later on, we analyze the minimal conditions for a models constructed over
a Heyting algebras that we need to prove that several Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set-theoretic
axioms are valid in a suitable algebraic-like models and finally, we present models for
Paraconsistent Nelon’s Set Theory, all this is part of the section 4 and 5.
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2 Non-classical Set Theory and their models
In this section we review the non-classical set theories in the literature. First, recall that
Boolean-valued models of set theory were introduced by Scott, Solovay and Vopnka in
1965; this theory can be found in Bell (2005), see [4].
Next, we will make a synthesis of the construction of Bell’s book for Zermelo-Frankeal
classical Set Theory, summarizing the fundamental concepts.
We fix a model of set theory V and an Booelan algebra A = (A,∧,∨, 0, 1,→) and
construct a universe of names by transfinite recursion:
Vξ
A = {x : x a function and ran(x) ⊆ A and dom(x) ⊆ VAζ for some ζ < ξ}
and
VA = {x : x ∈ Vξ
A for some ξ}
The class VA is called the Boolean-valued model over A. We note that this definition
does not depend on the algebraic operations in A, but only on the set A, so any expansion
of A to a richer language will give the same class of names VA. By L∈, we denote the
first-order language of set theory using only the propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ⊥, and
→. We can now expand this language by adding all of the elements of VA as constants;
the expanded (class-sized) language will be called LA. The (meta-)induction principle for
VA can be proved by a simple induction on the rank function: for every property Φ of
names, if for all x ∈ VA, we have
∀y ∈ dom(x)(Φ(y) implies Φ(x)),
then all names x ∈ VA have the property Φ. We can now define a map || · || assigning
to each negation formula in LA a truth value in A as follows.
Definition 2.1 For a given complete Boolean algebra A. If u, v ∈ VA and ϕ formulas,
then the mapping || · || : LA → A is defined for closed formulas:
||⊥|| = 0,
||u ∈ v|| =
∨
x∈dom(v)
(v(x) ∧ ||x ≈ u||)
||u ≈ v|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x))→ ||x ∈ v||) ∧
∧
x∈dom(v)
(v(x)→ ||x ∈ u||)
||ϕ#ψ|| = ||ϕ||#˜||ψ||, for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→},
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||∃xϕ|| =
∨
u∈VA
||ϕ(u)||,
||∀xϕ|| =
∧
u∈VA
||ϕ(u)||.
||ϕ|| is called the truth-value of the sentence ϕ in the language LA in V
A
Boolean-valued model over A.
As usual, we abbreviate ∃x(x ∈ u ∧Ψ(x)) by ∃x ∈ uΨ(x) and ∀x(x ∈ u → Ψ(x)) by
∀x ∈ uΨ(x) and call these bounded quantifiers. We say that γ is valid in VA if ||γ|| = 1
and write, VA  γ. The basic system of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory here is called ZF and
consists of first order version QCL of Classical logic (CL) over the first-order signature
Θ which contains an equality predicate ≈ and a binary predicate ∈. The system ZF is
the first order theory with equality obtained from the logic QCL over Θ by adding the
following set-theoretic axiom schemas:
(Extensionality) ∀x∀y[∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ (z ≈ y)]
(Pairing) ∀x∀y∃w∀z[z ∈ w ↔ (z ≈ x ∨ z ≈ y)]
(Colletion) ∀x[(∀y ∈ x∃zφ(y, z))→ ∃w∀y ∈ x∃z ∈ wφ(y, z)]
(Powerset) ∀x∃w∀z[z ∈ w ↔ ∀y ∈ z(y ∈ x)]
(Separation) ∀x∃w∀z[z ∈ w ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(z))]
(Empty set) ∃x∀z[z ∈ x↔ ¬(z ≈ z)]
The set satisfying this axiom is, by extensionality, unique and we refer to it with
notation ∅.
(Union) ∀x∃w∀z[z ∈ w ↔ ∃y ∈ x(z ∈ y)]
(Infinity) ∃x[∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x(y+ ∈ x)]
From union and pairing and extensionality, we can note by y+ the unique set y ∪ {y}.
(Induction) ∀x[(∀y ∈ xφ(y))→ φ(x)]→ ∀xφ(x).
The original intuition of Boolean-valued models was that the names represent objects
and that the equivalence classes of names under the equivalence relation defined by u ∼ v
if and only if ||u ≈ v|| = 1 can serve as the ontology of the new model. In particular,
this means that if two names represent the same object, they should instantiate the same
properties. This is known as indiscernibility of identicals, one of the directions of Leibniz’s
Law. In our setting, we can represent this by a statement of the type
||u ≈ v|| ∧ ||Ψ(u)|| ≤ ||Ψ(v)||.
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Clearly, the Boolean-valued models VA verify this Law. So, we have the following
Theorem 2.2 All the axioms, hence all the theorems, of ZF are valid in VA.
Now, replacing the Boolean algebra by a Heyting algebra, one obtains a Heyting-valued
model. The proofs of the Boolean case transfer to the Heyting-valued, where the logic of
the Heyting algebra determines the logic of the Heyting-valued model of set theory. This
idea was further generalized by Takeuti & Titani (1992); Titani (1999); Titani & Kozawa
(2003); and Ozawa (2017), replacing the Heyting algebra by appropriate lattices that
allow models of quantum set theory or fuzzy set theory. After this, Lo¨we and Tarafder
proposed a class of reasonable implication algebra in order to construct algebraic-valued
models that validate all axioms of the negation-free fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory, [27, 26, 25, 24]. From now on, we shall call this Set Theories as non-classical set
Theories.
It is important to note that there are different kinds of models for the above non-
classical Set Theories, see for instance, [19, 18, 6].
Zermelo-Fraenkel type set theories with models are the based on Intuitionistic, Fuzzy,
Quantum logics and the family of set theories based on intermediate logics between the
classical logics and the mentioned logics. Such non-classical set theories are particularly
based on algebraizable logics and the models can be constructed over algebras that are
semantics of such logics.
Other models, such as the ones constructed over sheaf, topoi, possible world Kripke’s
semantics, or topological spaces are possible to be constructed due to the algebrizebility
of the associated logics. While it is possible that these models need very sophisticated
technical work, the existence of such models is strongly based on the fact that these set
theories already have models of different nature.
Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axioms are valid in models of these set theories; that is to say, the
set theories are sound from the logics point of view. Even though we have not seen a
proof the correctness, we think it is not possible to give it due to a consequence of Go¨dels
incompletness theorem.
In general, the models of logic systems live in what philosophers call Meta-Mathematics
and it is here where all mathematics mainly live; namely, analysis, algebra, topology and
whichever branch we know. This is exactly where Go¨del’s proof lives.
Although we can formalize new set theories, the models are construted over the set
of recursive fucntions and the ordinal numbers of Meta-Mathematics. Thus, we think
that Go¨dels proof is possible to be given to each set theory; hence, these set theories are
incomplete from this point of view.
Recall that Go¨del’s proof of the famous incompletness theorem proved the indecibility
of certain formulas of Russell and Whiteheads Principia Mathematica. Specifically, Go¨del
proves that there are properties of natural numbers that are true, but they can not
5
be formally proved in the logical system. Russell and Whitehead’s logical system of
Principia Mathematica was elaborated with the intention to make Hilbert’s dream a
reality. That is to say, to find a logical system where each mathematical theorem (of the
Meta-Mathematics) has a logical theorem that reflects it.
Go¨dels proof shows the impossibility of that dream in the most simple mathematics,
i.e. that of the natural numbers where certain recursive functions are possible to be
defined. Now is the right moment to ask ourselves: What did Hilbert look for? A model
for all mathematics? The logic provides the models to other disciplines such as Philosophy,
Computer Science, Economics, Physics, and so on. In this sense, Is it possible to have a
model of all? We do not think so. Mathematical models are not more than simplifications
of the area we want to model; indeed, very useful ones which allow a measure forward
in knowledge, but the reality to be modeled is much more complex than the model can
express and mathematics is not the exception.
It is worth mentioning that in the non-classical Set Theories mentioned above, the
negation formulas are positive formulas; indeed, ¬x := x → ⊥. Leibniz’s law is verified
for the positive formulas for each of these Set Theories. It is easy to see that all these
systems can not produce paraconsistency; i.e., either only a formula, or its negation is
valid.
Our reflexions over Meta-Mathematics are part of our research, allowing an undertand-
ing and development of our objectives. Initially, we believed that to work in Paraconsistent
Set Theory we would have to develop a kind of theory of recursive funtions and transfinite
recursion. As above said, we have at our disposal these tools in Meta-Mathematics.
3 Paraconsistent Set Theory and Leibniez’ Law
Going back to our topic, type ZF Paraconsistent Set Theories (PSTs) can be constructed
in two groups; namely, one where Russell’s paradox is accepted and another where the
theories can be constructed using a paraconsistent logic.
Paraconsistent set theories of the first group have been studied by many authors
(Brady, 1971; Brady & Routley, 1989; Restall, 1992; Libert, 2005; Weber, 2009, 2010,
2013); all of these accounts start from the observation that ZF was created to avoid the
contradiction that can be obtained from the axiom scheme of Comprehension
∃x∀y(y ∈ x↔ Ψ(y))
via Russells paradox. Arguing that contradictions are not necessarily devastating in
a paraconsistent setting, these authors reinstate the axiom scheme of Comprehension as
acceptable, allow the formation of the Russell set R, and conclude that both R ∈ R and
R 6∈ R are true, see [8, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34].
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Now, on PST of the second group the following papers can be mentioned [9, 10].
In these works, the authors try to present models for certain PSTs type ZF (that we
denote, PS3-ZF) in both papers models for positive fragment of PS3-ZF are presented;
i.e, formulas without paraconsistent negation. Besides, in these papers the philosophical
concept called Leibniz Law (LL) is studied, observing that the LL is not verified for
formulas with negation for PS3-ZF. Eve more, in [29], the author proved that the axiom
SEPARATION of ZF is not valid for formulas with negation. This fact shows that it is
not possible to provide models in this way, but that does not mean that PS3-ZF has no
models.
Moreover, we have worked in other paraconsistent algebrizable logics without success,
aiming to prove Leibniz law on a PST. Particularly, Priest’s paraconsistent logics that
he called da Costa logic were studied by us, see [21, 22]. This logic is algebrizable with
the Blok-Pigozzi’s method. We had realized that LL is an essential technical resource to
prove the soundness of all axioms of ZF. Later on, we decided to change the strategy using
non-determinism to finding models, we had in our hands two kinds of non-determinism,
one from the Nmatrix of Avron and the other from Fidel’s structures. Avron’s non-
determinism is more unstable that of Fidel’s . The former is a non-determinism via
multialgebras. In the paper [11], we see that the formulas of first-order logic have a dis-
connect with his corresponding interpretations, producing a technical difficulty to give
proofs. However, the latter, Fidel’s non-determinism strongly uses the algebraic fragment
of the system and formulas with negation have a valoration belonging to a certain al-
gebra. These formulas with negation do not have an associated interpretation, but we
can always assign a value of truth to them. Hence, as we can see in the paper [17],
Fidel’s non-determinism is more stable. The associated interpretation of negation-free
first-order formulas works exactly in the same way as the algebraic case. These formulas
verify Leibniz law as the intuitionistic case. Constructing F -structures-valued models for
Paraconsistent Set Theory type ZF based on da Costas Logic Cω (ZFCω), we can see that
Leibniz law is verified by formulas with negation that allow proving that all axioms of ZF
are valid on Fidel’s models . It is possible to assign a value of truth belonging to a certain
Heyting algebra to the formulas with negation. We do not known which is the real value,
but we know there exists and it verifies the law.
On the other hand, we show that Cω is not algebrizable in the Blok-Pigozzis sence;
besides, we present a family of non-algebraic extentions of Cω with Fidel’s models for each
of them. For each extention of Cω, we associate it a Paraconsistent Set Theory and present
a full model for each one. It is worth mentioning that a very important philosophical
concept as Leibniz law is definitely the only technical obstacle to getting full models;
this fact will be part the our future studies. Another interesting aspect of these PSTs
do not permit Russell’s paradox. Besides, the same strategy to use non-determinism can
be applied for PS3-ZF. Actually, the logic PS3 seems to have two different F-strutures;
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namely, one based on Boolean algebras and another based on Heyting alegbras. Moreover,
we can treat the algebrizable paraconsistent logics introduced by Priest in this way.
Now, we shall briefly present our results about ZFCω for the details the reader can
consult our paper [17]. We fix a model of set theory V and a completed Cω-structure
(A,N). Let us construct a universe of names by transfinite recursion on (A,N):
We fix a model of set theory V and a completed Cω-structure 〈A,N〉. Let us construct
a universe of names by transfinite recursion:
Vξ
〈A,N〉 = {x : x a function and ran(x) ⊆ A and dom(x) ⊆ V
〈A,N〉
ζ for some ζ < ξ}
and
V〈A,N〉 = {x : x ∈ Vξ
〈A,N〉 for some ξ}
The V〈A,N〉 is called the Cω-structure-valued model over 〈A,N〉. Let us observe that
we only need set A in order to define V
〈A,N〉
ξ . By L∈, we denote the first-order language
of set theory which consists of the propositional connectives {→,∧,∨,¬} of the Cω and
two binary predicates ∈ and ≈. We can expand this language by adding all the elements
of V〈A,N〉; the expanded language we will denote L〈A,N〉.
Induction principles: The sets Vζ = {x : x ⊆ Vξ, for some ξ < ζ} are definable
for every ordinal ξ and then, every set x belongs to Vα for some α.
So, this fact induce a function rank(x) = least ordinal ξ such that x ∈ Vξ. Since
rank(x) < rank(y) is well-founded we induce a principle of induction on rank: let Ψ
be a property over sets. Assume, for every set x, if Ψ(y) holds for every y such that
rank(y) < rank(x), then Ψ(x) holds. Thus, Ψ(x) for every x. From the latter, the
following (meta-)Induction Principles (IP) holds in V〈A,N〉:
Let us consider a property Ψ over sets. Assume, for every x ∈ V〈A,N〉, if Ψ(y) holds for
every y ∈ dom(x), then Ψ(x) holds. Hence, Ψ(x) holds for every x ∈ V〈A,N〉.
By simplicity, we note every set u ∈ V〈A,N〉 by its name u of L〈A,N〉. Besides, we will
write ϕ(u) instead of ϕ(x/u). Now, we are going to define a valuation by induction on
the complexity of a closed formula in L〈A,N〉.
Definition 3.1 For a given complete Cω-structure 〈A,N〉, the mapping || · || : L〈A,N〉 →
〈A,N〉 is defined as follows:
||u ∈ v|| =
∨
x∈dom(v)
(v(x) ∧ ||x ≈ u||)
||u ≈ v|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x))→ ||x ∈ v||) ∧
∧
x∈dom(v)
(v(x)→ ||x ∈ u||)
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||ϕ#ψ|| = ||ϕ||#˜||ψ||, for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→},
||¬α|| ∈ N||α|| and ||¬¬α|| ≤ ||α||,
||∃xϕ|| =
∨
u∈V〈A,N〉
||ϕ(u)|| and ||∀xϕ|| =
∧
u∈V〈A,N〉
||ϕ(u)||.
||ϕ|| is called the truth-value of the sentence ϕ in the language L〈A,N〉 in the
Cω-structure-valued model over 〈A,N〉.
Definition 3.2 A sentence ϕ in the language L〈A,N〉 is said to be valid in V
〈A,N〉, which
is denoted by V〈A,N〉  ϕ, if ||ϕ|| = 1.
It is important to note that for every completed Cω-structure 〈A,N〉, the element∧
x∈A
x is the first element of A and so, A is a complete Heyting algebra, we denote by ”0”
this element. Besides, for every closed formula φ of L〈A,N〉 we have ||φ|| ∈ A. Then, the
following lemma has the same proof as intuitionistic set theory.
Lemma 3.3 For a given completed Cω-structure 〈A,N〉. Then, ||u ≈ u|| = 1, u(x) ≤
||x ∈ u|| for every x ∈ dom(u), and ||u = v|| = ||v = u||, for every u, v ∈ V〈A,N〉
3.1 Ontological principle
The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle that states that there cannot be
separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. To suppose that
two things indiscernible is suppose they are the same thing under different names.
A form of the principle indiscernibility of identicals is attributed to the German
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In the non-classical set theories, we have that
the manes represent objects and if we have identical objects they would have to have the
same properties. This is known as indiscernibility of identicals and it could be considered
as Leibniz’s law by the following axiom:
u ≈ v ∧ ϕ(u)→ ϕ(v)
In the next, we are going to consider complete Cω-structures which verify the Leibniz’s
law. It is important to note that we have Cω-structures that verify this law, it is enough
to require 1 ∈ Nx for all x ∈ A for every x 6= 1 and 0 ∈ N1.
We will adopt the following notation, for every formula ϕ(x) and every u ∈ V〈A,N〉:
∃x ∈ uϕ(x) = ∃x(x ∈ u∧ϕ(x)) and ∀x ∈ uϕ(x) = ∀x(x ∈ u→ ϕ(x)). Thus, we have the
following
Lemma 3.4 Let 〈A,N〉 be a complete Leibniz Cω-structure, for every formula ϕ(x) and
every u ∈ V〈A,N〉 we have
||∃x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∨
x∈dom(u)
(u(x) ∧ ||ϕ(x)||),
||∀x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→ ||ϕ(x)||).
The basic system of paraconsistent set theory here is called ZFCω and consists of first
order version QCω of Cω over the first-order signature Θω which contains an equality
predicate ≈ and a binary predicate ∈.
Definition 3.5 The system ZFCω is the first order theory with equality obtained from the
logic QCω over Θω by adding the following set-theoretic axiom schemas: (Extensionality),
(Pairing), (Colletion), (Powerset), (Separation), (Empty set), (Union), (Infinity) and
(Induction).
Theorem 3.6 Let 〈A,N〉 be a complete Cω-structure such that V
〈A,N〉 satisfies Leibniz’s
Law. Then, the all set-theoretic axioms of ZFCω are valid inV
〈A,N〉
 ϕ.
Corollary 3.7 The axiom of scheme Comprehension is not valid in V〈A,N〉.
It is enough to see that ||∃x∀y(y ∈ x)|| = 0, this formula ∃x∀y(y ∈ x) is an instance
of Comprehension.
4 Leibniz’s law and its models
In this section we shal analyze the minimal conditions for a models constructed over
a Heyting algebras that we need to prove that several Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set-theoretic
axioms are valid in a suitable algebraic-like models.
We fix a model of set theory V and a completed reasonable implication algebra A.
Let us construct a universe of names by transfinite recursion:
Vξ
A = {x : x a function and ran(x) ⊆ A and dom(x) ⊆ VAζ for some ζ < ξ}
VA = {x : x ∈ Vξ
A for some ξ}
10
The class VA is called the algebraic-valued model over A. Let us observe that we only
need the set A in order to define Vξ
〈A,N〉. By L∈, we denote the first-order language of
set theory which consists of only the propositional connectives {→,∧,∨,¬} of the Cω and
two binary predicates ∈ and =. We can expand this language by adding all the elements
of V〈A,N〉; the expanded language we will denote L〈A,N〉. For this construction of models
we also have Induction principles as the case above.
Now, we shall consider a minimal requirement for defining value of truth of formulas in
order to prove some of set-theoretic axiom of Zermelo-Freankel for Set Theory are valid.
Now, for a given completed Heyting algebra A, the mapping || · || : LA → A is defined as
follow:
||u ∈ v|| =
∨
x∈dom(v)
(v(x) ∧ ||x ≈ u||)
||u ≈ u|| = 1
||u ≈ v|| ≤ ||φ(u)→ φ(v)|| for every formula φ,
||¬ϕ|| = ||ϕ||∗,
||ϕ#ψ|| = ||ϕ||#˜||ψ||, for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→},
||∃xϕ|| =
∨
u∈VA
||ϕ(u)|| and ||∀xϕ|| =
∧
u∈VA
||ϕ(u)||.
||ϕ|| is called the truth-value of the sentence ϕ in the language LA in the
algebraic-valued model over A.
Definition 4.1 A sentence ϕ in the language LA is said to be valid in V
A, which is
denoted by VA  ϕ, if ||ϕ|| = 1.
Lemma 4.2 For a given completed reasonable implication algebra A. Then, u, v ∈ VA
we have
(i) ||u = v|| = ||v = u||,
(ii) u(x) ≤ ||x ∈ u|| for every x ∈ dom(u).
Proof. (i) Let us consider the formula φ(z) := u = z, then ||u = v|| ≤ ||φ(u) →
φ(v)|| = ||u = u|| → ||v = u|| = 1 → ||v = u|| = ||v = u||. Analogously, we have
||v = u|| ≤ ||u = v||.
(ii) ||x ∈ u|| =
∨
z∈dom(u)
(u(z) ∧ ||z = x||) ≥ u(x) ∧ ||x = x|| = u(x). 
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We will adopt the following notation, for every formula ϕ(x) and every u ∈ V〈A,N〉:
∃x ∈ uϕ(x) = ∃x(x ∈ u ∧ ϕ(x)) and ∀x ∈ uϕ(x) = ∀x(x ∈ u→ ϕ(x)).
Now, we recall that for a given Heyting algebra A we have the following properties
hold: (P1) x ∧ y ≤ z implies x ≤ y ⇒ z and (P3) y ≤ z implies z ⇒ x ≤ y ⇒ x for any
x, y, z ∈ A.
Thus, we have the following
Lemma 4.3 Let A be a Heyting algebra algebra, for every formula ϕ(x) and every u ∈ VA
we have
||∃x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∨
x∈dom(u)
(u(x) ∧ ||ϕ(x)||),
||∀x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→ ||ϕ(x)||).
Proof. Form the definition of || · || we have:
||∃x ∈ uϕ(x)|| = ||∃x(x ∈ u∧ϕ(x))|| =
∨
v∈VA
(||v ∈ u||∧||ϕ(v)||) =
∨
v∈VA
∨
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)∧
||x = v|| ∧ ||ϕ(v)||) =
∨
x∈dom(u)
u(x) ∧
∨
v∈VA
(||x = v|| ∧ ||ϕ(v)||).
Now, we have ||v = x ∧ ϕ(v)|| ≤ ||ϕ(x)|| and ||x = x ∧ ϕ(x)|| = ||ϕ(x)||. Therefore,∨
z∈dom(u)
u(x) ∧
∨
v∈VA
(||z = u|| ∧ ||ϕ(v)||) =
∨
x∈dom(u)
||u(x) ∧ ϕ(x)||.
On the other hand,
||∀x ∈ uϕ(x)|| = ||∀x(x ∈ u→ ϕ(x))|| =
∧
v∈VA
||v ∈ u|| → ||ϕ(v)||
Then, we have∧
x∈dom(u)
[u(x) → ||ϕ(x)||] ∧ ||v ∈ u|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
[u(x) → ||ϕ(x)||] ∧
∨
x∈dom(u)
(u(x) ∧ ||v =
x||) =
∨
x∈dom(u)
(
∧
x∈dom(u)
[u(x) → ||ϕ(x)||] ∧ u(x) ∧ ||v = x||) ≤ (P5)
∨
x∈dom(u)
||ϕ(x)|| ∧ ||v =
x|| ≤ ||ϕ(v)||
Form the latter and (P1), we can conclude that
∧
x∈dom(u)
[u(x)→ ||ϕ(x)||] ≤ ||v ∈ u|| →
||ϕ(v)||.
Now using Lemma 2.3 (ii) and (P3) we obtain∧
v∈VA
||v ∈ u|| → ||ϕ(v)|| ≤
∧
v∈dom(u)
||v ∈ u|| → ||ϕ(v)|| ≤
∧
v∈dom(u)
||u(v)|| → ||ϕ(v)||. 
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Definition 4.4 Let A be a complete Heyting algebra. Given collection of sets {ui : i ∈
I} ⊆ VA and {ai : i ∈ I} ⊆ A, then mixture Σi∈Iai · ui is the fucntion u with dom(u) =⋃
i∈I
dom(ui) and u(x) =
∨
i∈I
ai ∧ ||x ∈ ui||.
The following result is known as Mixing Lemma and its proof is exactly the same for
intuitionistic case because it is an assertion about positive formulas.
Lemma 4.5 Let u be the mixture Σi∈Iai · ui. If ai ∧ aj ≤ ||ui = uj|| for all i, j ∈ I, then
ai ≤ ||ui = u||.
A set B refines a set A if for all b ∈ B there is some a ∈ A such that b ≤ a. A Heyting
algebra H is refinable if every subset A ⊆ H there exists some anti-chaim B in H that
refines A and verifies
∨
A =
∨
B.
Theorem 4.6 Let A be a complete Heyting algebra such that A is refinable. If VA 
∃xψ(x), then there is u ∈ VA such that VA  ψ(u).
Now, given a complete Heyting A′ of A, we have the associated models VA
′
and VA.
Then, it is easy to see that VA
′
⊆ VA.
On the other hand, we say that a formula ψ is restricted if all quantifiers are of the
form ∃y ∈ x or ∀y ∈ x, then we have
Lemma 4.7 For any complete Heyting algebra A′ of A and any restricted negation-free
formula ψ(x1, · · · , xn) with variables inV
A
′
the equality ||ψ(x1, · · · , xn)||
A
′
= ||ψ(x1, · · · , xn)||
A.
Next, we are going to consider the Boolean algebra 2 = ({0, 1},∧,∨,¬, 0, 1) and the
natural mapping ·ˆ : VA → V2 defined by uˆ = {〈vˆ, 1〉 : v ∈ u}. This is well defined by
recursion on v ∈ dom(u). Then, we have the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4.8 (i) ||u ∈ vˆ|| =
∨
x∈v
||u = xˆ|| for all v ∈ V and u ∈ VA,
(ii) u ∈ v ↔ VA  uˆ ∈ vˆ and u = v ↔ VA  uˆ = vˆ,
(iii) for all x ∈ V2 there exists a unique v ∈ V such that V2  x = vˆ,
(iv) for any formula negation-free formula ψ(x1, · · · , xn) and any x1, · · · , xn ∈ V, we
have ψ(x1, · · · , xn) ↔ V
2
 ψ(xˆ1, · · · , xˆn). Moreover for any restricted negation-
free formula φ, we have φ(x1, · · · , xn)↔ V
A
 φ(xˆ1, · · · , xˆn).
The proof of the last theorem is the same for intuitionistic case because we consider
restricted negation-free formulas and it will be used to prove the validity of axiom Infinity.
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4.1 Validating axioms
New, we are going to prove the validity of several set-theoretical axioms of ZF and let us
consider a fix model VA. Then:
Pairing
Let u, v ∈ VA and consider the function w = {〈u, 1〉, 〈v, 1〉}. Thus, we have that
||z ∈ w|| = (w(u)∧ ||z = u||)∨ (w(v)∧ ||z = v||) = ||z = u|| ∨ ||z = v|| = ||z = u∨ z = v||.
Union
Given u ∈ VA and consider tha function w with dom(w) =
⋃
v∈dom(u)
dom(v) and
w(x) =
∨
v∈Ax
v(x) where Ax = {v ∈ dom(u) : x ∈ dom(v)}. Then,
||y ∈ w|| =
∨
x∈dom(w)
(||x = y|| ∧
∨
v∈Ax
v(x))
=
∨
x∈dom(w)
∨
v∈Ax
(||x = y|| ∧ v(x))
=
∨
v∈dom(u)
∨
x∈dom(v)
(||x = y|| ∧ v(x))
= ||∃v ∈ u(y ∈ v)||.
Separation
Given u ∈ VA and suppose dom(w) = dom(u) and w(x) = ||x ∈ u|| ∧ ||φ(x)|| then
||z ∈ w|| =
∨
x∈dom(w)
(||y ∈ w|| ∧ ||φ(y)|| ∧ ||y = z||)
≤
∨
x∈dom(w)
(||φ(z)|| ∧ ||y = z||).
Besides,
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||φ(z)|| ∧ ||y = z|| =
∨
y∈dom(u)
(u(y) ∧ ||z = y|| ∧ ||φ(z)||)
≤
∨
y∈dom(u)
(||y ∈ u|| ∧ ||z = y|| ∧ ||φ(y)||)
=
∨
y∈dom(u)
(w(y) ∧ ||z = y||) = ||z ∈ w||.
Infinity
Assume the formula ψ(x) is ∅ ∈ x∧∀y ∈ x(y+ ∈ x). Then, the axiom in question is the
sentence ∃xψ(x). Now, it is clear that the negation-free formula ∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x(y+ ∈ x)
is restricted and certainly ψ(ω) is true. Hence, by Lemma 4.8 (iv), we get ||ψ(ωˆ)|| = 1,
and so, ||∃xψ(x)|| = 1.
Collection
Given u ∈ VA and x ∈ dom(u) there exists by Axiom of Choice some ordinal αx such
that
∨
y∈VA
||φ(x, y)|| =
∨
y∈VAαx
||φ(x, y)||. For α = {αx : x ∈ dom(u)} and v the function
with domain VA and range {1}, we have
||∀x ∈ u∃yφ(x, y)|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→
∨
y∈V〈A,N〉
||φ(x, y)||)
=
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→
∨
y∈V
〈A,N〉
α
||φ(x, y)||)
=
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→ ||∃y ∈ vφ(x, y)||)
= ||∀x ∈ u∃y ∈ vφ(x, y)||
≤ ||∃w∀x ∈ u∃y ∈ wφ(x, y)||.
5 First-order of the paracosinsistent Nelson’s logic
Paracosinsistent Nelson’s logic, for short PNL, was studied systematically by Odintsov.
For more details and information of the issue the reader can consult Odintsov’s book [28].
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In the paper [1], Akama considered at the first time the PNL in 1999.
In this part of the paper, we shall present F -structures as semantics for first-order ver-
sion of paracosinsistent Nelson’s logic. First, assume the propositional signature proposi-
tional languages L = {∨,∧,→,¬,⊥}, where ¬ is a symbol for strong negation as well as,
the symbol ∀, universal quantifier, and ∃, existential quantifier, together with punctua-
tion marks, commas and parentheses. Besides, let V ar = {v1, v2, ...} be a numerable set
of individual variables. A first-order signature Θ is also composted by the pair 〈P,F〉,
where P denotes a non-empty set of predicate symbols and F is a set of function symbols.
The notions of bound and free variables, closed terms, sentences, and substitutability are
defined as usual. We denote by FmΘ over the set of all formulas of Θ and by Ter the
absolutely free algebra of terms. Sometimes, we say that FmΘ is the language over Θ.
By ϕ(x/t) we denote the formula that results from ϕ by replacing simultaneously all
the free occurrences of the variable x by the term t. The connectives of equivalence ↔
and of strong equivalence ⇔ are defined as follows: ψ ↔ φ := (ψ ↔ φ) ∧ (φ ↔ ψ),
ψ ⇔ φ := (ψ ↔ φ) ∧ (¬ψ ↔ ¬φ). As above, logics will be defined via Hilbert-style
deductive systems with only the rules of substitution and modus ponens. In this way, to
define a logic it is enough to give its axioms. First-order version of paraconsistent Nelsons
logic N4, for short QN4, is a logic in the language L characterized by the following list of
axioms:
Axioms
(N1) α→ (β → α),
(N2) (α→ (β → γ))→ ((α→ β)→ (α→ γ)),
(N3) (α ∧ β)→ β,
(N4) (α ∧ β)→ α,
(N5) α→ (β → (α ∧ β)),
(N6) α→ (α ∨ β),
(N7) β → (α ∨ β),
(N8) (α→ γ)→ ((β → γ)→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ)),
(N9) ∼ (α→ β)↔ α∧ ∼ β,
(N10) ∼ (α ∧ β)↔∼ α∨ ∼ β,
(N11) ∼ (α ∨ β)↔∼ α∧ ∼ β,
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(N12) ∼ (¬α)↔ α,
(N13) ∼ (∼ α)↔ α,
(A1) ϕ(x/t)→ ∃xϕ, if t is a term free for x in ϕ,
(A2) ∀xϕ→ ϕ(x/t), if t is a term free for x in ϕ,
Inference rules
(MP)
α, α→ β
β
,
(R3)
α→ β
∃xα→ β
, and x does not occur free in β,
(R4)
α→ β
α→ ∀xβ
, and x does not occur free in α.
It is worth mentioning that in the propositional setting if we take the axioms from
(N1) to (N13) with the rule modus ponens we have the propositional logic N4. Besides, if
we add the axiom (N14) ∼ α→ (α→ β) we have Nelson logics that is known as N3, see
[28, Section 8.2]. Now, we introduce a class of F -structures that will serve as semantics
for QN4. First, recall that Fidel presented for the first time F -structures as semantics for
N3 in [15].
Now, recall that an algebra A = 〈A,∨,∧,→, 0, 1〉 is said to be a Heyting algebra if
the reduct 〈A,∨,∧, 0, 1〉 is a bounded distributive lattice and the condition x ∧ y ≤ z iff
x ≤ y → z (∗) holds. Besides, the algebra A = 〈A,∨,∧,→, 1〉 is said to be generalized
Heyting algebra if the reduct A = 〈A,∨,∧〉 it is a distributive lattice and ∗ is verified.
Definition 5.1 A F -structure for N4 is a system 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉 where A is a generalized
Heyting algebra and {Nx}x∈A is a family of set of A such that the following conditions
hold:
(i) for any x ∈ A, Nx 6= ∅,
(ii) for any x, y ∈ A, x′ ∈ Nx and y
′ ∈ Ny, the following relations hold x
′ ∨ y′ ∈ Nx∧y
and x′ ∧ y′ ∈ Nx∨y, x ∈ Nx′,
(iii) for any x, y ∈ A, y′ ∈ Nx, we have x ∧ y
′ ∈ Nx→y.
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We are going to use the convention of algebraic logic, we will write sometimes 〈A,N〉
instead of 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉. Besides, we call the F -structures for N4 by N4-structures. As
example of N4-structure, we can take a generalized Heyting algebra A and the set N sx =
{y ∈ A : x ∨ y = 1}. The structure 〈A, {N sx}x∈A〉 will be said to be a saturated N4-
structure.
The N4-structure 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉 is said to be a substructure of the N4-structure 〈B, {N
′
x}x∈B〉
if A is a subalgebra of B and Nx ⊆ N
′
x holds for x ∈ A. It is easy to see all N4-structure
〈A, {Nx}〉 is a substructure of 〈A, {N
s
x}〉 defined before.
Definition 5.2 A Θ-structure A is a pair (〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉,S) where 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉 is a
completed N4-structure; i.e., A is a completed generalized Heyting algebra. Besides, S =
〈S, {PS}P∈P , {fS}f∈F〉 is composted by a non-empty domain S, a function PS : S
n →
〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉, for each n-ary predicate symbol P ∈ P, and a function fS : S
n → S, for
each n-ary function symbol f ∈ F .
We are going to consider the usual notion of derivation of a formula α form Γ in QN4
and we denote by Γ ⊢ α. Besides, for a given Θ-structure A = (〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉,S), we say
that a mapping v : V ar → S is a A-valuation, or simply a valuation. By v[x → a] we
denote the A-valuation where v[x → a](x) = a and v[x → a](y) = v(y) for any y ∈ V ar
such that y 6= x.
Definition 5.3 Let A = (〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉,S) be a Θ-structure and v a A-valuation from
V ar into S. We define the truth values of the terms and the formulas in A for a valuation
v as follows:
||x||Av = v(x),
||f(t1, · · · , tn)||
A
v = fS(||t1||
A
v , · · · , ||tn||
A
v ), for any f ∈ F ,
||P (t1, ..., tn)||
A
v = PS(||t1||
A
v , ..., ||tn||
A
v ), for any P ∈ P,
||ϕ#ψ||A = ||ϕ||A#||ψ||A, for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→},
||¬α||Av ∈ N||α||Av and ||¬¬α||
A
v = ||α||
A
v ,
||¬(α ∨ β)||Av = ||¬α||
A
v ∧ ||¬β||
A
v and ||¬(α ∧ β)||
A
v = ||¬α||
A
v ∨ ||¬β||
A
v ,
||¬(α→ β)||Av = ||α||
A
v ∧ ||¬β||
A
v ,
||∀xα||Av =
∧
a∈S
||α||Av[x→a],
||∃xα||Av =
∨
a∈S
||α||Av[x→a],
||α(x/t)||Av = ||α||
A
v[x→||t1||Av ]
, if t is a term free for x in ϕ.
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It worth mentioning that the substitution condition ||ϕ(x/t)||Av = ||ϕ||
A
v[x→||t||Av ]
can
be proved for first order algebrizable logics. In our setting using F -structures for QN4
the negation-free formulas works exactly as the algebrizable case and the sustitution
conditions holds, but for the atomic formulas with negation do not have an interpretation
associated of them. Hence, we need to impose the substitution condition as axiom as it
was done for for da Costa’s non-algebrizable paracosnistent logic Cω in [17].
Now, we say that A and v satisfy a formula ϕ, denoted by A  ϕ[v], if ||ϕ||Av = 1.
Besides, we say that ϕ is true A if ||ϕ||Av = 1 for each a A-valuation v and we denote by
A  ϕ. We say that ϕ is a semantical consequence of Γ in QN4, if, for any structure A: if
A  γ for each γ ∈ Γ, then A  ϕ. For a given set of formulas Γ, we say that the structure
A is a model of Γ iff A  γ for each γ ∈ Γ.
Recall that a logic defined over a language S is a system L = 〈For,⊢〉 where For is
the set of formulas over S and the relation ⊢⊆ P(For) × For ( P(A) is the set of all
subsets of A). The logic L is said to be a tarskian if it satisfies the following properties,
for every set Γ ∪ Ω ∪ {ϕ, β} of formulas:
(1) if α ∈ Γ, then Γ ⊢ α,
(2) if Γ ⊢ α and Γ ⊆ Ω, then Ω ⊢ α,
(3) if Ω ⊢ α and Γ ⊢ β for every β ∈ Ω, then Γ ⊢ α.
A logic L is said to be finitary if it satisfies the following:
(4) if Γ ⊢ α, then there exists a finite subset Γ0 of Γ such that Γ0 ⊢ α.
Definition 5.4 Let L be a tarskian logic and let Γ∪{ϕ} be a set of formulas, we say that
Γ is a theory. Besides, Γ is said to be a consistent theory if there is ϕ such that Γ 6⊢L ϕ.
Besides, we say that Γ is a maximal consistent theory if Γ, ψ ⊢L ϕ for any ψ /∈ Γ and in
this case, we say Γ non-trivial maximal respect to ϕ.
A set of formulas Γ is closed in L if the following property holds for every formula ϕ:
Γ ⊢L ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ. It is easy to see that any maximal consistent theory is closed
one.
Lemma 5.5 (Lindenbaum- Los) Let L be a tarskian and finitary logic. Let Γ∪ {ϕ} be
a set of formulas such that Γ 6⊢ ϕ. Then, there exists a set of formulas Ω such that Γ ⊆ Ω
with Ω maximal non-trivial with respect to ϕ in L.
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Proof. It can be found [35, Theorem 2.22]. 
It is clear that QN4 is a finitary and tarskian logic. So, we are in conditions to show
the following adequacy theorem. First, we can observe that for given a formula ϕ and
suppose {x1, · · · , xn} is the set of variable of ϕ, the universal closure of ϕ is defined by
∀x1 · · · ∀xnϕ. Thus, it is clear that if ϕ is a sentence then the universal closure of ϕ is
itself.
Theorem 5.6 Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmΘ. Then, Γ ⊢ ϕ iff Γ  ϕ.
Proof. We are going to consider a fixed structure M = 〈(A,N),S〉. Let ϕ be a formula
such that Γ ⊢ ϕ. Then, there exists α1, · · · , αn a derivation of ϕ from Γ. If n = 1 then
ϕ is an axiom or ϕ ∈ Γ. If ϕ ∈ Γ, then it is easy to see that Γ  ϕ. Besides, to prove
the first-order version of each propositional axioms from N4 are valid is a routine, see for
instance [16]. Now, for the sake of brevity we shall denote ||ϕ||v instead of ||ϕ||
M
v .
(A1) Suppose that ϕ is α(t/x) → ∃xα. Then, ||ϕ||v = ||α||v[x→||t||v] → ||∃xα||v. It
is clear that ||α||v[x→||t||v] ≤
∨
a∈S
||α||v[x→a] and then, ||α||v[x→||t||v] ≤ ||∃xα||v. Therefore
||α(t/x)→ ∃xα||v = 1 and this holds for every valuation v. (A2) is analogous to (A1).
Suppose now that ||αj||v = 1 for each j < n.
If there exists {j, k1, · · · , km} ⊆ {1, · · · , j − 1} such that αk1 , · · · , αkm is a derivation
of α→ β. Let us suppose that ϕ is ∃xα→ β, where x is not free in β, and it is obtained
by applying (∃ − In). From induction hypothesis ||α → β||v = 1 for every valuation v.
Now, consider ||∃xα → β||v = ||∃xα||v → ||β||v =
∨
a∈S
||α||v[x→a] → ||β||v. On the other
hand, since ||α → β||v = ||α||v → ||β||v = 1, then we have that ||α||v ≤ ||β||v for each
valuation v. Hence, ||α||v[x→a] ≤ ||β||v[x→a] = ||β||v for every a ∈ S because x is free in β.
So,
∨
a∈S
||α||v[x→a] → ||β||v = ||∃xα→ β||v = ||ϕ||v = 1. The rest of the proof is left to the
reader.
Conversely, let us suppose Γ  ϕ and Γ 6⊢ ϕ. Then, from the definition of , (A2) and
(∀−In), we have ∀Γ  ∀ϕ and ∀Γ 6⊢ ∀ϕ (∗). From the latter and Lindenbaum- Los lemma,
there exists Ω maximal consistent theory such that ∀Γ ⊆ Ω and Ω 6⊢ ϕ. Let’s consider the
quotient algebra A := FmΘ/Ω where [α]Γ = {β ∈ FmΘ : Ω ⊢ α → β,Ω ⊢ β → α} is the
class of α by Ω. So, it is not hard to see 1 = [β]Γ = Γ for every β ∈ Γ (i.e. Γ ⊢ β). It is
clear that A is a generalized Heyting algebra, and the a canonical projection q : Fm→ A
such that q(α) = [α]Ω is a homomorphism such that q
−1({1}) = Ω. Let us consider the
Θ-structure A = (〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉, T er) and let v : V ar → Ter be the identity function.
So, we can consider ||.||v : Fm → 〈A, {Nx}x∈A〉 defined by ||α||v = [α]Γ. Now, we have
to prove ||∀xα||v =
∧
a∈Ter
||α||v[x→a] and ||∃xα||v =
∨
a∈Ter
||α||v[x→a]. Indeed, for any term
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t we denote tˆ the new constant. Now, from (A1) we have ⊢ ψ(x/tˆ) → ∃xψ for every
term t free for x in ψ. So, Γ ⊢ ψ(x/tˆ) → ∃xψ. Thus, ||ψ(x/tˆ) → ∃xψ||v = ||ψ(x/tˆ)||v →
||∃xψ||v = ||ψ||v[x→||tˆ||v] → ||∃xψ||v = ||ψ||v[x→t] → ||∃xψ||v = 1 for every t ∈ Ter. Now,
let us suppose there is sentence φ such that ||ψ(x/tˆ)||v ≤ ||φ||v for every term in the some
before condition; that is to say, ||φ||v is a upper bound of the set {||ψ(x/tˆ)||v} and x is
free in φ. Thus, ||ψ(x/tˆ) → φ||v = 1. and therefore, Γ ⊢ ψ(x/tˆ) → φ for every t in the
same condition.
In particular for xˆ, we have ||α(x)||v ≤ ||β||v where v(x) = xˆ. Therefore, Γ ⊢ ψ(x)→
φ. So, from (R3), we can infer that Γ ⊢ ∃xψ(x) → φ and then, ||∃xψ||v ≤ ||φ||v.
Therefore, ||∃xα||v =
∨
a∈Ter
||α||v[x→a]. The rest of proof is completely analogous, but now
by using (A2) and (R4). Therefore, || · ||v is a valuation such that [ψ]Ω = 1 iff Ω ⊢ ψ. Now,
consider the complete lattice A∗ by MacNeille completion of A, see [3]. Thus, consider
the Θ-structure A∗ = (〈A∗, {Nx}x∈A∗〉, T er). Now, since ∀Γ is a set of sentences then
||γ||v = ||γ||µ for every valuation µ and each γ ∈ ∀Γ. Therefore, by definition , we
obtain that A∗  γ for each γ ∈ ∀Γ but A∗ 6 ∀ϕ which contradicts the statement (∗).

5.1 Paraconsistent Nelson’s Set Theory
The basic system of paraconsistent set theory here is called ZF-N4 and consists of first
order version QN4 of N4 over the first-order signature Θω which contains an equality
predicate ≈ and a binary predicate ∈. The system ZF-N4 is the first order theory with
equality obtained from the logic QN4 over Θω by adding the following set-theoretic axiom
schemas: (Extensionality), (Pairing), (Colletion), (Powerset), (Separation), (Empty set),
(Union), (Infinity) and (Induction), see Section 2.
Now, we construct the class V〈A,N〉 of N4-structure-valued model over 〈A,N〉 following
Section 3. By L∈, we denote the first-order language of set theory which consists of the
propositional connectives {→,∧,∨,¬} of the N4 and two binary predicates ∈ and ≈. We
can expand this language by adding all the elements of V〈A,N〉; the expanded language
we will denote L〈A,N〉. Now, we are going to define a valuation by induction on the
complexity of a closed formula in L〈A,N〉. Then, for a given complete N4-structure 〈A,N〉,
the mapping || · || : L〈A,N〉 → 〈A,N〉 is defined as follows:
||u ∈ v|| =
∨
x∈dom(v)
(v(x) ∧ ||x ≈ u||)
||u ≈ v|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x))→ ||x ∈ v||) ∧
∧
x∈dom(v)
(v(x)→ ||x ∈ u||)
||ϕ#ψ|| = ||ϕ||#˜||ψ||, for every # ∈ {∧,∨,→},
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||¬ϕ||Av ∈ N||ϕ||Av and ||¬¬ϕ||
A
v = ||α||
A
v ,
||¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)||Av = ||¬ϕ||
A
v ∧ ||¬ψ||
A
v and ||¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)||
A
v = ||¬ϕ||
A
v ∨ ||¬ψ||
A
v ,
||¬(ϕ→ ψ)||Av = ||ϕ||
A
v ∧ ||¬ψ||
A
v ,
||∃xϕ|| =
∨
u∈V〈A,N〉
||ϕ(u)|| and ||∀xϕ|| =
∧
u∈V〈A,N〉
||ϕ(u)||.
||u ≈ v|| ≤ ||¬φ(u)|| → ||¬φ(v)|| for any formula φ
||ϕ|| is called the truth-value of the sentence ϕ in the language L〈A,N〉 in the
Cω-structure-valued model over 〈A,N〉.
Now, we say that a sentence ϕ in the language L〈A,N〉 is said to be valid in V
〈A,N〉,
which is denoted by V〈A,N〉  ϕ, if ||ϕ|| = 1.
For every completed N4-structure 〈A,N〉, the element
∧
x∈A
x is the first element of A
and so, A is a complete Heyting algebra, we denote by ”0” this element. Besides, for every
closed formula φ of L〈A,N〉 we have ||φ|| ∈ A and so the proof of the following Lemma can
be given ins the exactly same way that was done in Lemmas 4.2
Lemma 5.7 For a given completed N4-structure 〈A,N〉. Then, ||u ≈ u|| = 1, u(x) ≤
||x ∈ u|| for every x ∈ dom(u), and ||u = v|| = ||v = u||, for every u, v ∈ V〈A,N〉
The following fact can be checked by induction on the structure of formulas.
Lemma 5.8 For any complete N4-structure the following Leiniz law: ||u ≈ v|| ≤ ||φ(u)→
φ(v)|| for any formula φ.
From the Lemmas 4.3 and 5.8, we have proven the following central result:
Lemma 5.9 Let 〈A,N〉 be a complete Leibniz N4-structure, for every formula ϕ(x) and
every u ∈ V〈A,N〉 we have
||∃x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∨
x∈dom(u)
(u(x) ∧ ||ϕ(x)||),
||∀x ∈ uϕ(x)|| =
∧
x∈dom(u)
(u(x)→ ||ϕ(x)||).
Taking into account the content of section 4, we have proven the following Theorem.
Theorem 5.10 Let 〈A,N〉 be a complete N4-structure. Then, the set-theoretic axioms
(Pairing), (Colletion), (Separation), (Empty set), (Union), (Infinity) and (Induction) are
valid in V〈A,N〉  ϕ.
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Now, we are in condition of proving the axioms (Extensionality) and (Powerset). In-
deed,
Theorem 5.11 Let 〈A,N〉 be a complete N4-structure. Then, the set-theoretic axioms
(Extensionality), (Powerset) and (Empty set) are valid in V〈A,N〉  ϕ.
Proof. Given x, y ∈ V〈A,N〉, then
||∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)|| = ||∀z((z ∈ x→ z ∈ y) ∧ (z ∈ y → z ∈ x)||
=
∧
z∈V〈A,N〉
(||z ∈ x|| → ||z ∈ y||) ∧
∧
z∈V〈A,N〉
(||z ∈ y|| → ||z ∈ x||)
≤
∧
z∈dom(x)
(||z ∈ x|| → ||z ∈ y||) ∧
∧
z∈dom(y)
(||z ∈ y|| → ||z ∈ x||)
≤
∧
z∈dom(x)
(x(z)→ ||z ∈ y||) ∧
∧
z∈dom(y)
(y(z)→ ||z ∈ x||)
= ||x = y||
Assume u ∈ V〈A,N〉 and suppose w a function such that dom(w) = {f : dom(u)→ A :
f function} and w(x) = ||∀y ∈ x(y ∈ u)||. Therefore,
||v ∈ w|| =
∨
x∈dom(w)
(||∀y ∈ x(y ∈ u)|| ∧ ||x = v||) ≤ ||∀y ∈ v(y ∈ u)||.
. Thus, axiom Extensionality is valid.
On the other hand, given v ∈ V〈A,N〉 and consider the function a such that dom(a) =
dom(u) and a(z) = ||z ∈ u|| ∧ ||z ∈ v||. So, it is clear that a(z) → ||z ∈ v|| = 1 for every
z ∈ dom(a), therefore
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||∀y ∈ v(y ∈ u)|| =
∧
y∈dom(v)
(v(y)→ ||y ∈ u||)
=
∧
y∈dom(v)
(v(y)→ (||y ∈ u|| ∧ v(y)))
≤
∧
y∈dom(v)
(v(y)→ a(y))
≤
∧
y∈dom(v)
(v(y)→ ||y ∈ a||) ∧
∧
z∈dom(a)
(a(z)→ ||z ∈ v||)
= ||v = a||
Since a(y) ≤ ||y ∈ u|| for every y ∈ dom(a) then we have ||∀y ∈ a(y ∈ u)|| = 1. Now by
construction we have that a ∈ dom(w) and so, ||∀y ∈ v(y ∈ u)|| ≤ ||∀y ∈ a(y ∈ u)||∧||v =
a|| = w(a) ∧ ||v = a|| ≤ ||v ∈ w||. Therefore, the axiom (Powerset) holds.
Now, we show that (Empty set) is valid. Indeed, first let us note that ||u = u|| = 1
for all u ∈ VA and then, ||¬(u = u)|| ∈ N1. Therefore, let us consider a function
w ∈ VA such that u ∈ dom(w) and ran(w) ⊆ {||¬(u = u)||}, then it is clear that
||u ∈ w|| =
∨
x∈dom(w)
(w(x) ∧ ||u = x||) = ||¬(u = u)|| which completes the proof.

It is worth mentioning that for proving the (Extensionality) and (Powerset) axioms
we only need the definition of valuation for atomic formulas formed with the predicates ∈
and ≈. For non-classical Set Theories this expression of the valuations permits to prove
the Leibniz law, but if one treat with a different negation; that is to say, a negation that
is not a positive formula, this law is not valid, then it is almost impossible to have more
different algebraic models for the law. What show that the non-determism is inherent
for Paraconsistent Set Theories. On the other hand, is it interesting or practical to have
a logical system that does not verify the law? We do not think so. What means to
have identical object that they have no the same properties? The answer is in the Meta-
Matematics, where the models to live, and it is there where the indentical object have
the same properties. This show us that to understanding what the logical systems can
express we need to have ”right” models.
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